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Abstract
Background: Timely and effective contact tracing is an essential public health measure for curbing the transmission of COVID-19.
App-based contact tracing has the potential to optimize the resources of overstretched public health departments. However, its
efficiency is dependent on widespread adoption.
Objective: This study aimed to investigate the uptake of the Australian Government’s COVIDSafe app among Australians and
examine the reasons why some Australians have not downloaded the app.
Methods: An online national survey, with representative quotas for age and gender, was conducted between May 8 and May
11, 2020. Participants were excluded if they were a health care professional or had been tested for COVID-19.
Results: Of the 1802 potential participants contacted, 289 (16.0%) were excluded prior to completing the survey, 13 (0.7%)
declined, and 1500 (83.2%) participated in the survey. Of the 1500 survey participants, 37.3% (n=560) had downloaded the
COVIDSafe app, 18.7% (n=280) intended to do so, 27.7% (n=416) refused to do so, and 16.3% (n=244) were undecided. Equally
proportioned reasons for not downloading the app included privacy (165/660, 25.0%) and technical concerns (159/660, 24.1%).
Other reasons included the belief that social distancing was sufficient and the app was unnecessary (111/660, 16.8%), distrust in
the government (73/660, 11.1%), and other miscellaneous responses (eg, apathy and following the decisions of others) (73/660,
11.1%). In addition, knowledge about COVIDSafe varied among participants, as some were confused about its purpose and
capabilities.
Conclusions: For the COVIDSafe app to be accepted by the public and used correctly, public health messages need to address
the concerns of citizens, specifically privacy, data storage, and technical capabilities. Understanding the specific barriers preventing
the uptake of contact tracing apps provides the opportunity to design targeted communication strategies aimed at strengthening
public health initiatives, such as downloading and correctly using contact tracing apps.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2020;6(4):e23081) doi: 10.2196/23081
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Introduction
COVID-19 is a viral disease caused by a newly discovered strain
of coronaviruses. People affected by the disease commonly
present with fever, cough, and shortness of breath. This disease
can also cause death, with varying rates observed in different
countries. In Australia, the first case of COVID-19 was
confirmed in late January 2020, with the first wave occurring
between March and May, 2020. In the absence of a vaccine,
nondrug interventions for preventing COVID-19 and any other
future infectious outbreaks are critical [1,2]. The public has
been asked to practice preventive behaviors, such as hand
hygiene, physical distancing, quarantining, and getting tested
when sick. These behaviors are being promoted by national and
international public health organizations through
population-based communication strategies. Alongside
individually practiced prevention strategies are population-based
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strategies such as contact tracing, which is critical for preventing
and slowing the spread of disease.
To improve public health contact tracing and the speed at which
it occurs, several countries have introduced app-based contact
tracing. Contact tracing apps vary in design, from reporting
symptoms to public health authorities [3] to allowing access to
phone data after testing positive for COVID-19 [4]. They also
vary in whether the data are centralized [5]. Furthermore, contact
tracing apps in current use have had varying degrees of success
[3,6]. Since the Australian Government launched the
COVIDSafe app in late April 2020 [4], over 6 million
Australians (almost 25%) have downloaded the app. However,
worldwide concerns have been raised about the privacy and
ethics of this digital approach [7], which may hamper app
downloads and decrease app effectiveness. This has been
reflected in the Australian uptake of the COVIDSafe app;
following its initial release, downloads have progressively
decreased. Currently, Australian downloads are short of the
40% proposed target for the app to be effective, and this has
not been anticipated to change without further government
intervention to increase uptake.
App-based contact tracing requires public cooperation.
Individuals are required to install the app, keep Bluetooth
functions on, have the app activated or open on their phones,
and carry their phones with them when outside of their home.
This sounds simple, but when considered from a behavior
change perspective, these behaviors are complex and need to
be performed together to optimize contact tracing functionality
[8]. To identify behavior change techniques for improving the
uptake of app-based contact tracing, we first need to understand
people’s reasons for not downloading the app. In this study, we
aimed to investigate the uptake of the Australian Government’s
COVIDSafe app among Australians, identify Australians’
understanding of the purpose and capabilities of the app, and
explore the reasons why some Australians chose not to download
the app.
Methods
Participants were recruited for a national, cross-sectional, online
survey by the panel provider, Dynata. The use of a panel
provider for online research provides confidence in attaining a
representative sample of the required size and allows for quick
completion of time-sensitive projects. The panel provider
adheres to our quotas for age, gender, and state/territory of
residence, ensuring that our sample is representative of the
broader population. Through Dynata, participants received
points for completing the survey, which may be used for gift
vouchers, donations, or cash redemption. Our sample was
representative of all Australian states and territories and met
our quotas for age and gender. Participants were included in
our study if aged ≥18 years. Participants were excluded if they
had, or thought they had, COVID-19. They were also excluded
if they were health care professionals, as this group may have
systematic differences in knowledge of COVID-19 compared
to the general Australian population.
Prior to screening, potential participants read detailed study
information, including eligibility criteria, what the study
involved, and privacy and confidentiality rights. Participants
were informed that commencing the survey indicated their
informed consent to participate in this study. Ethics approval
was obtained from the Bond University Human Research Ethics
Committee (#RT03008).
All participants were asked whether they had downloaded, or
intended to download, the COVIDSafe app. If they responded
“unsure” or “no intention to download,” they were asked to
provide a reason for their response. We qualitatively coded the
reasons for inaction and uncertainty and conducted a thematic
content analysis of open-ended responses. Uninformative
responses, such as “not sure,” were not coded. If multiple
concerns were mentioned, only the first response was coded.
The code frame was initially developed by RT, and then
discussed and refined by the other authors. Afterward, 1 author
(RT) completed the qualitative analysis of all responses.
Participants then rated their strength of agreement for 6
statements related to the app’s purpose and capabilities using
a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree;
option for “don’t know” response was available). The survey
items and response scale are available in Multimedia Appendix
1.
Results
Of the 1802 potential participants contacted, 289 (16.0%) were
screened as ineligible prior to completing the survey and were
excluded, 13 (0.7%) declined, and 1500 (83.2%) participated
in the survey. There was representation across all adult age
groups and sexes (50.0% male), and education levels were
distributed evenly (high school and technical and further
education qualification or lower: 735/1500, 49.0%; tertiary
qualification: 765/1500, 51.0%) (Table 1).
Of the 1500 survey participants, 37.3% (560/1500) said they
downloaded the COVIDSafe app, 18.7% (280/1500) had
intended to, 27.7% (416/1500) refused, and 16.3% (244/1500)
were undecided. Of the 660 who refused or were undecided,
25.0% (n=165) cited privacy concerns as their primary reason.
For example, many distrusted the security of the app; some
participants believed that the COVIDSafe app was not safe and
that it could be hacked, resulting in their information being used
without their authority. Another 24.1% (159/660) cited technical
problems, such as phones being too old or limitations in data
consumption and storage space. Other reasons for being
undecided or refusing to download the app included the belief
that social distancing was sufficient and the app was
unnecessary, distrust in the government, questioning the app’s
effectiveness, wanting to explore more information before
deciding, and other miscellaneous responses, such as apathy
and following the decisions of others (Table 2).
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Table 1. Participants’ characteristics (N=1500).
Values, n (%)Characteristics
750 (50.0)Female
Age (years)
171 (11.4)18-24
264 (17.6)25-34
239 (15.9)35-4
223 (14.9)45-54
222 (14.8)55-64
227 (15.1)65-74
154 (10.3)≥75
Education
459 (30.6)High school graduate or lower
276 (18.4)Trade certificate (I-IV)
765 (51.0)Tertiary
Australian states and territories
302 (20.1)Queensland
471 (31.4)New South Wales
29 (1.9)Australian Capital Territory
9 (0.6)Northern Territory
160 (10.7)Western Australia
382 (25.5)Victoria
34 (2.3)Tasmania
113 (7.5)South Australia
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
17 (1.1)Yes
1471 (98.1)No
12 (0.8)Prefer not to say
1049 (69.9)Born in Australia
Table 2. Reasons for not downloading the COVIDSafe app (N=660).
Values, n (%)Reasons for not downloading
165 (25.0)Privacy concerns
159 (24.1)Technical problems
111 (16.8)App is unnecessary
73 (11.1)Distrust in the government
46 (7.0)Questioning effectiveness of app
33 (5.0)Need more information before deciding
73 (11.1)Uncoded miscellaneous reasons
With respect to the app’s intended purpose and capabilities,
almost 75% of participants correctly agreed that the app would
make contact tracing faster and easier (strongly agree: 558/1500,
37.2%; agree: 570/1500, 38.0%), and almost 72% correctly
agreed that more people who were potentially exposed to
COVID-19 would be found and informed (strongly agree:
505/1500, 33.7%; agree 593/1500, 39.5%) (Figure 1). In
contrast, almost 50% of participants incorrectly thought that
their personal information would be shared after the pandemic
(strongly agree: 172/1500, 11.5%; agree: 274/1500, 18.3%;
neither: 304/1500, 20.3%), and almost 72% incorrectly thought
that the app would detect when people with COVID-19 were
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near them (strongly agree: 321/1500, 21.4%; agree: 540/1500,
36.0%; neither: 227/1500, 15.1%) (Figure 1). Interestingly,
participants were divided in knowing whether the app would
inform them that it was safe to leave their house (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Participants’ ratings for the suggested purposes and capabilities of the COVIDSafe app (N=1500).
In Table 3, we descriptively report the differences in intentions
to download the COVIDSafe app between age groups. We did
not perform statistical analyses on these subgroups. However,
there appears to be little difference between age groups in terms
of the number of app downloads and the number of people who
intended to download the app. For example, in the youngest
age group, 60.8% (104/171) of our sample had already
downloaded, or intended to download, the app, and 58.4%
(90/154) of participants in the oldest age group had done, or
intended to do, the same (Table 3). This pattern was also
observed for those who decided to not download the app or
were undecided.
Table 3. Age groups and intentions to download the COVIDSafe app.
TotalUnsure, n (%)Refused to download, n (%)Intend to download, n (%)Downloaded, n (%)Age group (years)
17117 (9.9)50 (29.2)52 (30.4)52 (30.4)18-24
26444 (16.7)57 (21.6)69 (26.1)94 (35.6)25-34
23942 (17.6)67 (28.0)39 (16.3)91 (38.1)35-44
22338 (17.0)70 (31.4)33 (14.8)82 (36.8)45-54
22244 (19.8)65 (29.3)31 (14.0)82 (36.9)55-64
22737 (16.3)65 (28.6)28 (12.3)97 (42.7)65-74
15422 (14.3)42 (27.3)28 (18.2)62 (40.3)≥75
1500244 (16.3)416 (27.7)280 (18.7)560 (37.3)Totala
aTotal n for each download behavior and % of total sample.
Discussion
Timely and effective contact tracing is an essential public health
measure for curbing the transmission of COVID-19. Contact
tracing apps are controversial in their design and level of
effectiveness [3,5,6], but they might have the potential to prevent
widespread community transmission and optimize the resources
of overstretched public health organizations [9]. An important
driver for their efficiency is widespread public adoption [9].
Our study aimed to examine Australian participants’
understanding of the Australian Government’s COVIDSafe app
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and explore the reasons why some Australians chose not to
download the app. Primarily, we found that while most people
correctly understood the intended purpose and capabilities of
the app, there was some crucial misunderstandings about the
contact tracing limits of the software (ie, whether the app can
detect when a person is close to someone with COVID-19 and
whether the app can let people know when it is safe to leave
home). Among those who were undecided or refused to
download the app, the main reasons for hesitation centered
around privacy and technological barriers, which are key
concerns that need to be addressed if uptake of the app is to
increase.
In total, 37.3% (560/1500) of our sample said they had
downloaded the app and 18.7% (280/1500) intended to. This
proportion is concordant with another Australian survey with
a smaller online sample (N=439), in which 44.0% of participants
reported downloading the COVIDSafe app [10]. However, based
on other surveys in which participants were asked whether they
intended to download hypothetical apps, the acceptability of
contact tracing apps is higher in other countries. For example,
in a recent online survey from Ireland (N>8000) [11], when
asked about downloading a contact tracing app that was not yet
available, 58% of participants said they would download it and
25% said they probably would [8]. Additionally, in another
online survey with almost 6000 participants from 5 countries
(ie, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, and the United
States), 75% of participants said they definitely or probably
would install a contact tracing app [12]. It would be interesting
to see whether people will actually follow through with their
intentions to download a contact tracing app.
With regard to open-ended text responses, 25% of participants
in our study who did not download the COVIDSafe app were
concerned about privacy. This is lower than the 31% in the
smaller Australian study [10] and the 41% in the Irish study
[11] who believed privacy was a problem. The differences in
these percentages may be due to the free-text responses available
in our survey, as the other studies used a list of options for
participants’ responses. Additionally, compared to the 11.1%
of participants in our survey who did not download the app
because they distrusted the government, there was more distrust
in postpandemic government surveillance with Irish participants
(33%) [11] and participants in the cross-country survey (42%)
[12]. When considering communication strategies for improving
contact tracing app downloads and use, better communication
approaches are needed to put the public’s concerns about privacy
and the government at ease.
Our study also reveals that there are missed communication
opportunities for correcting erroneous beliefs about the
capabilities of the COVIDSafe app. Over half of our participants
(810/1500, 54.0%) thought the COVIDSafe app would or might
tell them when it was safe to leave the house, and 40.5%
(607/1500) thought it would or might tell them whether they
had COVID-19 (Figure 1). Addressing these perceptions and
issues about the capabilities of the app with public messaging
is important for achieving sufficient uptake of contact tracing
apps.
Based on reviewer feedback and the fact that older adults are
disproportionally affected by COVID-19, we performed a
posthoc analysis to descriptively examine the uptake of the app
by age. App downloads appeared to increase with age, with the
65-74-year and ≥75-year age groups having the highest
proportion of downloads, and this trend may reflect older adults’
vulnerability to COVID-19. However, when the number of
people who downloaded or intended to download the app were
combined, the differences between age groups were much
smaller. Almost one-third (416/1500, 27.7%) of participants,
regardless of age, chose not to download the app.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to qualitatively analyze
open-ended text responses to barriers for downloading a contact
tracing app. Compared to having participants select a response
from a list of predefined options, our approach decreases
potential researcher biases and strengthens the ability to inform
communication techniques for improving app uptake. To further
minimize bias, we deliberately recruited a sample with
representation from all Australian states and territories and
quotas for age and gender. We believe this strategy improved
the generalizability of our findings to the broader Australian
population. However, we did not assess cultural and linguistic
diversity. Therefore, the generalizability of our findings is
limited to Australians, and our results may not reflect the
perceptions of individuals whose primary language is not
English.
Although the level of effectiveness of contact tracing is still
unclear [3,6], apps have been used in various countries to help
with both contact tracing [4] and medical management of
COVID-19 cases [13]. Their utility comes from being used as
an adjunct contact tracing strategy alongside public health staff,
particularly when community transmissions are high. For apps
to be accepted by the public and used correctly, we need to
better communicate concerns about privacy, data storage, and
technical capabilities. The lessons learned during the COVID-19
pandemic will be invaluable for inevitable future infectious
outbreaks.
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Multimedia Appendix 1
Table detailing the COVIDSafe survey items and scores.
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References
1. Hoffmann T, Glasziou P. What if the vaccine or drugs don’t save us? Plan B for coronavirus means research on alternatives
is urgently needed. The Conversation. Online: The Conversation; 2020 Apr 21. URL: https://theconversation.com/
what-if-the-vaccine-or-drugs-dont-save-us-plan-b-for-coronavirus-means-research-on-alternatives-is-urgently-needed-136833
[accessed 2020-10-26]
2. Michie S, West R. Behavioural, environmental, social, and systems interventions against covid-19. BMJ 2020 Jul
28;370:m2982. [doi: 10.1136/bmj.m2982] [Medline: 32723732]
3. Kendall M, Milsom L, Abeler-Dorner L, Wymant C, Ferretti L, Briers M, et al. COVID-19 incidence and R decreased on
the Isle of Wight after the launch of the Test, Trace, Isolate programme. medRxiv Preprint posted online on July 14, 2020.
[doi: 10.1101/2020.07.12.20151753]
4. Australian Government, Department of Health. COVIDSafe app. Health. URL: https://www.health.gov.au/resources/
apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app [accessed 2020-10-26]
5. Culnane C, Leins K, Rubinstein BI. Tracking, tracing, trust: contemplating mitigating the impact of COVID-19 through
technological interventions. Med J Aust 2020 Jul;213(2):94-94.e1 [FREE Full text] [doi: 10.5694/mja2.50683] [Medline:
32583470]
6. Wise J. Covid-19: Test and trace system is not fit for purpose, says Independent SAGE. BMJ 2020 Jun 09;369:m2302.
[doi: 10.1136/bmj.m2302] [Medline: 32518067]
7. Abeler J, Bäcker M, Buermeyer U, Zillessen H. COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can Go Together. JMIR
Mhealth Uhealth 2020 Apr 20;8(4):e19359 [FREE Full text] [doi: 10.2196/19359] [Medline: 32294052]
8. Michie S, Atkins L, West R. The behaviour change wheel. In: The Behaviour Change Wheel A Guide to Designing
Interventions. Great Britain: Silverback Publishing; 2014:1003-1010.
9. Currie DJ, Peng CQ, Lyle DM, Jameson BA, Frommer MS. Stemming the flow: how much can the Australian smartphone
app help to control COVID-19? Public Health Res Pract 2020 Jun 30;30(2) [FREE Full text] [doi: 10.17061/phrp3022009]
[Medline: 32601652]
10. Garret P, White J, Little D, Perfors A, Kashima Y, Lewandowsky S, et al. A Representative Sample of Australian Participant’s
Attitudes Towards the COVIDSafe App. GitHub. URL: https://paulgarrettphd.github.io/Site/Wave3PrelimAnalysis.html
[accessed 2020-10-26]
11. O'Callaghan ME, Buckley J, Fitzgerald B, Johnson K, Laffey J, McNicholas B, et al. A national survey of attitudes to
COVID-19 digital contact tracing in the Republic of Ireland. Research Square Preprint posted online on July 10, 2020.
[FREE Full text] [doi: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-40778/v1]
12. Altmann S, Milsom L, Zillessen H, Blasone R, Gerdon F, Bach R, et al. Acceptability of app-based contact tracing for
COVID-19: Cross-country survey evidence. medRxiv Preprint posted online on May 8, 2020. [FREE Full text] [doi:
10.1101/2020.05.05.20091587]
13. Echeverría P, Mas Bergas MA, Puig J, Isnard M, Massot M, Vedia C, et al. COVIDApp as an Innovative Strategy for the
Management and Follow-Up of COVID-19 Cases in Long-Term Care Facilities in Catalonia: Implementation Study. JMIR
Public Health Surveill 2020 Jul 17;6(3):e21163 [FREE Full text] [doi: 10.2196/21163] [Medline: 32629425]
Edited by T Sanchez; submitted 02.08.20; peer-reviewed by V Lewis, D Juzwishin; comments to author 18.09.20; revised version
received 09.10.20; accepted 12.10.20; published 04.11.20
Please cite as:
Thomas R, Michaleff ZA, Greenwood H, Abukmail E, Glasziou P
Concerns and Misconceptions About the Australian Government’s COVIDSafe App: Cross-Sectional Survey Study
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2020;6(4):e23081
URL: http://publichealth.jmir.org/2020/4/e23081/
doi: 10.2196/23081
PMID:
©Rae Thomas, Zoe A Michaleff, Hannah Greenwood, Eman Abukmail, Paul Glasziou. Originally published in JMIR Public
Health and Surveillance (http://publichealth.jmir.org), 04.11.2020. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work, first published in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance,
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2020 | vol. 6 | iss. 4 | e23081 | p. 6http://publichealth.jmir.org/2020/4/e23081/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Thomas et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX
is properly cited. The complete bibliographic information, a link to the original publication on http://publichealth.jmir.org, as
well as this copyright and license information must be included.
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2020 | vol. 6 | iss. 4 | e23081 | p. 7http://publichealth.jmir.org/2020/4/e23081/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Thomas et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX
